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LINKING MICRO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY & DECISION-
MAKING: TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A 
PARTISAN CITIZEN FORUM 
 
Stephen Elstub 
 
The paper argues that decision-making is central to deliberative democracy, 
especially in its micro institutional form. However, distinct trade-offs between 
theory and practice are required to ensure that this link is present. These 
trade-offs also vary depending on whether the forums are based on sortition 
or partisanship. The paper locates the trade-offs at the various decision-
making stages between theory and practice in a partisan citizen forum in the 
Peak District in the UK.  
 
 
The premise of this paper is that it is essential to the idea of deliberative 
democracy that it involves public debate that leads to decisions (Bohman 1996: 177; 
Dryzek 2000: 2; Squires 2002: 142; Leib 2004: 5-6, 39; Cohen 2007: 219; Elstub 
2008a). A close link with decision-making is especially important in micro 
deliberation (Hendriks 2006). However, the approximation of micro deliberation in 
practice, and ensuring that it leads to collectively binding decisions, is made 
extremely difficult due to practical exigencies that require trade-offs (Blaug 1999). 
Empirical evidence from approximations of deliberative democracy in practice is 
therefore essential to illuminate the nature, location and extent of the trade-offs 
(Blaug 1999: 134; Eckersley 2000: 125; Thompson 2008; Smith 2009: 96).   
 
However, most empirical research on micro deliberative democracy has 
focused on mini-publics, which bring together a random sample of unpartisan citizens 
and rarely result in binding decisions. This is not to say that these mini-publics are not 
illuminating and important sources of empirical evidence, or that they are not vital 
institutions with an important role to play in approximating deliberative democracy in 
practice, but rather that research is also required on approximations of partisan micro-
deliberation where those participating are coming together to make collectively 
binding decisions that affect themselves. Consequently, this paper will review such a 
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case study, the Stanage Forum, the purpose of which was to produce an effective 
Management Plan, through the participation of all key stakeholders, for the North 
Lees Estate, an area in the Peak District, a national park in the UK. The analysis of 
events and processes in the Stanage Forum, and comparison with mini-publics, will 
aid the understanding of the specific tensions that exist between theory and practice in 
partisan micro deliberative democracy and its link with decision making. Although 
such trade-offs are relative to the context, it is thought that the case is representative 
to a degree, so some general themes in relation to theory and practice will be 
articulated. After first making the case for the importance of a link between micro 
deliberation and decision-making, the paper will introduce the Stanage Forum. Trade-
offs between the theory of deliberative democracy and the processes of the five 
decision-making stages present in the Stanage Forum, (Agenda setting, deliberation, 
decision-making, implementation and review), will then be mapped in turn. As Smith 
argues this is ‘a highly stylized’ account of decision-making processes, but it does still 
act as a ‘useful heuristic’ (Smith 2009: 23). Similarly Habermas’s (1990) ideal speech 
situation (ISS) is employed as a theoretical heuristic.  
 
Micro-Deliberative Democracy and Partisan Decision-Making 
 
The argument here is that democracy in general, and therefore deliberative 
democracy, involves collective decision-making. Furthermore, that micro deliberative 
democracy in particular is the institutionalised decision-making element of 
deliberative democracy.  
 
Democracy involves ‘collective decision-making through the equal 
participation of all relevant actors’, while deliberation is ‘the give-and-take of rational 
arguments’ (Elstub 2006: 302; cf. Elster 1998: 8). Therefore deliberative democracy 
is ultimately a decision-making mechanism: ‘Deliberation, generically understood is 
about weighing the reasons relevant to that decision with a view to making a decision 
on the basis of that weighing’; while ‘democracy is a way of making binding, 
collective decisions’ (Cohen 2007: 219; see also Bohman 1996: 177; Elster 1998: 
492; Dryzek 2000: 2; Squires 2002: 142; Leib 2004: 5-6, 39; Elstub 2008a: 170). It is 
though important to acknowledge that the link between deliberation and decision-
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making, is far from being an all or nothing affair, but is scalar and an issue of 
proximity (Chambers 2009).  
 
Hendriks (2006) suggests that there are two broad types of strategy for 
institutionalizing deliberative democracy micro and macro, which are distinguished in 
relation to scale and formality of deliberation. Micro deliberative democracy focuses 
on ideal deliberative procedures, within small-scale structured arenas within the state, 
orientated to decision-making, with impartial participants deliberating together in one 
place and at one time. Alternatively, macro deliberative democracy favours informal 
and unstructured, and spontaneous discursive communication that occurs across space 
and time, aimed at opinion formation, within civil society, outside and often against 
the formal decision-making institutions of the state, with partisan deliberators.  
 
Micro conceptions of deliberative democracy tend to be made up of free and 
equal impartial participants selected through random stratified sampling such as mini-
publics (Hendriks 2006: 492). They do engage partisan participants in their processes 
as a mechanism to ensure a range of relevant opinions and information are articulated 
to the random sample of citizens, but not to deliberate themselves (Hendriks 2006). 
As Goodin (2008: 11) explains mini-publics are made up of ordinary, non-partisan, 
lay citizens and are ‘designed to be groups small enough to be genuinely deliberative 
and representative enough to be genuinely democratic’ and include citizens’ juries, 
deliberative opinion polls, planning cells and consensus conferences. Mini-publics 
rarely result in binding decisions because they usually involve a stratified random 
sample of unpartisan participants who are not affected by a decision. In fact it is 
unlikely that these mini-publics would be seen as legitimate if they did result in 
binding decisions, precisely because of this factor, and go against traditional notions 
of democratic accountability. Ultimately if a random selection of citizens were to 
make decisions, there is no mechanism to hold them accountable for the decision 
(Bader and Bartlett 2005; Parkinson 2006; Goodin 2008; Smith 2009: 169, 176, 187; 
191).i The commissioning authority therefore pick and choose which 
recommendations from the jury to accept (McLaverty 2009; Smith 2009), which is for 
some critics means they are too easily manipulated (Furedi 2005: 118-19). Citizens’ 
juries are then easily co-opted by government ‘for if the jury’s recommendations are 
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not already supported by the government, they are likely to be ignored’ (McLaverty 
2009; see also Smith 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, mini-publics have generally been the preferred method for the 
institutionalisation of micro deliberative democracy as it is thought that non-partisan 
participants are more likely to transform their preferences in light of new reasons 
(Pelletier et al. 1999; Smith 2000; Hendriks 2006: 497; Hendriks 2002: 70; Dryzek 
2007; Hendriks et al. 2007), which is an essential element of deliberative democracy 
(Elster 1998: 6; Elstub 2006: 303). It is the contention here that deliberation in small 
scale decision-making and deliberative forums that involve partisan deliberators 
should also be classed as micro deliberation. Habermas argues that having to justify 
preferences for a decision to those who will be affected by the decision encourages 
deliberators to form preferences in accordance with public concerns and motivates us 
to offer reasons that can be accepted by all. This is the principle at the heart of the 
ISS, which embodies the norms of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1990). In fact 
Dryzek suggests that ‘theoretical presentations of deliberative democracy normally 
assume that deliberators are partisans’ (Dryzek 2007: 246). Deliberative democrats 
that feel mini-publics are the only methods available to institutionalise deliberative 
democracy seem to lack faith in the power of public reason, instead thinking it 
seemingly necessary to ensure a focus on the common good and a willingness to 
change preferences by ensuring that those deliberating do not have an interest or 
opinion in the decision itself. Although having unpartisan participants does indeed 
facilitate this, partisanship cannot be removed from the political process; we must and 
should have faith in the deliberative process itself to encourage preference 
transformation and recognition of the common good. 
 
Moreover, there are deliberative democrats that do not see partisan 
deliberation as a barrier to preference transformation (Urbinati 2000: 775). The more 
proximate a decision is to deliberation the greater the incentive to participate and to 
attempt to persuade other participants with reasons (Walsh 2007; Elstub 2008b). The 
need for a decision to be reached can make preference differences seem ‘less 
germane’ (Cohen 2007: 224), while an unproximate decision can ‘exacerbate divides’ 
(Walsh 2007: 24). Partisanship in politics does seem to be inevitable, we cannot 
dismiss and eliminate it, and neither is partisanship necessarily bad. It is necessary 
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therefore to ‘think about how they can be harnessed in the effort to constitute a good 
political regime’ (Elkin 2004: 75; Elstub 2008). Micro deliberative partisan forums 
attempt to do just this. This type of mechanism accepts partisanship and self-interest 
as facts of the political process, but tries to incorporate these interests into a 
deliberatively democratic opinion formation and decision-making process that will 
encourage consideration of the interests of others.  More empirical evidence then is 
also required on partisan deliberative forums, and the trade-offs required between 
theory and practice, as these are likely to be different to the trade-offs in unpartisan 
forums. One such case study, that meets all these criteria, is the Stanage Forum, to 
which the paper now turns. 
 
Introducing the Stanage Forum  
 
The Peak District is a national park in the north of England in the UK which 
the Peak District National Park Authority (PDNPA) has been devolved the power to 
manage. The PDNPA have opened up their meetings to more direct participation from 
the public, and implemented several public participation initiatives. One such 
initiative is the Stanage Forum. The purpose of the Stanage Forum is to produce an 
effective ten year Management Plan, for the North Lees Estate.  
 
 Stanage Edge is a cliff feature that is central to the North Lees Estate, (hence 
the name of the Forum), and attracts hundreds of thousands of visitors each year.  The 
area is also internationally important for wildlife, as it provides a range of habitats 
(PDNPA 2000; Croney and Smith 2003: 15). There are also areas of archaeological, 
cultural and historical interest on the estate. In addition the estate hosts a working 
farm and has several rural communities within it and nearby. As the estate is situated 
between two large cities, Sheffield and Manchester, meaning there is also significant 
commuter traffic, as no motorway links these cities. This range of uses and features 
has meant that a tension between recreational use, cultural, economic and 
environmental concerns exists in the Estate.   
 
Between 2000 and 2002 there were four Forums held to form the Management 
Plan and since then there has been an annual Forum to review and revise it. Each 
Forum lasts a day. In addition to the PDNPA, and the Forum, there was also a Forum 
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facilitator, a Design and a Steering Group. The Design Group’s roles included helping 
design a process and a set of procedures for the first Forum meeting, and selecting 
those who would be members of the Steering Group. The Steering Group’s roles 
included discussion and clarification of issues covered in the Forum; selection and 
consultation of Technical Groups to act as advisers; setting of deadlines for the 
various stages of the Management Plan process; approving and commenting upon the 
draft of the Management Plan and providing representation for the key stakeholders. 
In total the Steering Group met twenty-two times over the two years the Management 
Plan was decided upon (Croney and Smith 2003: 16), and has met quarterly since. 
Issue-based Technical Groups, selected by the Steering Group, were also used to 
provide specialist information on certain areas where information was lacking, such as 
ecological issues and traffic management, but had no decision-making powers 
themselves (Elstub 2009).   
 
Participants in the Stanage Forum can be categorised into three broad stakeholder 
groups: recreationalists, environmentalists, and locals (residents and business). 
Although these stakeholder groups are not mutually exclusive as it is possible to be in 
all three at once, in general the recreationalists’ main concern was access. The 
environmentalists’ priorities were the conservation and enhancement of the local 
ecology. The locals were seeking to foster the economic and social well being of the 
local communities. This was by far the most divided stakeholder group.  Much of the 
local economy is generated by the tourism of the area, so many locals were loathed to 
restrict access. They also wanted to ensure convenient commuter links to the cities of 
Sheffield and Manchester and to preserve the area as a nice place to live, and limiting 
tourism was seen as important to achieve this. Although there are many 
commonalities of interests between the stakeholder groups, there are also clear 
tensions. Unrestricted access is incompatible with the preservation of the 
environment.  Easy access by car is incompatible with farming, maintenance of the 
beauty of the estate, lack of pollution of the area, and the area being a nice place to 
live.  Use for all recreational pursuits is incompatible with peacefulness, wilderness 
and environmental considerations of the area (Elstub 2009).  
 
Trade-0ffs between the Theory and Practice of Deliberative Democracy in 
the Stanage Forum 
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The theoretical norms of deliberative democracy are best embodied by 
Habermas’s ISS,  where communication is undistorted because all participants are 
free and equal, all views are aired in an unlimited discourse, aimed at rational 
consensus and the ‘unforced force of the better argument’ is decisive (Habermas 
1990: 56-58; Elstub 2008b: 61). Practical realities mean that such ideal deliberative 
democracy only exists as a theoretical construct, as the ISS is a ‘methodological 
fiction’, (Habermas 1996: 326), but should still be employed to guide practice 
(Habermas 1996: 340), even if it can only ‘ever be approximated (rather than fully 
realised) in everyday politics’ (Eckersley 2000: 127; see also Cohen 1997; Lieb 2004: 
40; Elstub 2008b: 99). Trade-offs between the ideal and practice, to regulate between 
legitimacy and efficiency, are therefore inevitable and these trade-offs will vary in 
relation to the practical situation (Blaug 1999: 140). The paper therefore uses the ISS 
and the decision-making stage process as useful heuristics to analyse the processes of 
the Stanage forum, the trade-offs that have occurred there, and in micro partisan 
forums more generally. Inevitably instances of micro deliberative democracy will 
approximate some aspects of deliberative democracy more closely than others. These 
trade-offs will vary from partisan to unpartisan forums too. It seems likely that the 
elements are all interrelated and the very fact that a practical example can 
approximate one aspect of deliberative democracy relatively closely might prevent it 
from approximating another aspect more closely. As Thompson (2008: 511) explains 
‘we miss the complexity and power of deliberative democracy if we do not recognise 
the possibility that its elements may conflict with one another, that not all the goods it 
promises can be secured at the same time, and that we have to make hard choices 
among them.’ The empirical study of this case study will help expose these inevitable 
trade-offs. The empirical data has been generated through a triangular combination of 
documentary analysis, participatory observational analysis (through participation in 
all of the Forums between 2000 and 2002 and several of the Steering group meetings), 
and semi- structured interviews with the Forum organiser and the Forum facilitator.   
 
Agenda Setting 
 
The controlling of the agenda is one of the most dynamic ‘faces’ of power 
(Bachrach and Barratz 1962; Lukes 1974; Schattsneider 1975). Ideally, in a 
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deliberative democracy the agenda would be set through equal democratic 
deliberation, to ensure that it was in accordance with public reason, and that all 
affected had an equal chance to influence it (Habermas 1990; Parkinson 2006: 170). 
Such an ideal process is though extremely difficult to achieve, as it leads to an 
inevitable regression (Michelman 1997), as who would organise and set the agenda 
for the deliberation on the agenda and so on. In practice deliberation must start 
somewhere, and it tends to be elites that will determine the start (Parkinson 2006: 
128-33). Consequently, in the agenda-setting stage, the ‘mobilisation of bias is at its 
highest’ (Smith 2001: 84), especially as all the stages of decisions being considered 
here are path dependent upon this first initial agenda-setting stage (Goodin 2005). 
 
This problem is clearly demonstrated in the Stanage Forum. Here the PDNPA 
had a significant agenda setting role as they decided the forum must produce a 
Management Plan. This is significant because the PDNPA is not a neutral apolitical 
body, but has its own interests. This then constrained the decision-making process to a 
degree especially as the PDNPA had a clear idea of what criteria they wanted the 
Management Plan to fulfil, which was disputed by the climbers. Nonetheless, the 
proposal for a forum did not emerge solely from the PDNPA acting in isolation. It 
was a response to the legitimacy and implementation problems they had experienced 
with the previous top-down Management Plan, but also demands from recreational 
visitors to the area, particularly climbers, and especially the British Mountaineering 
Council (BMC) who opposed the PDNPA’s decision to introduce car park charges 
and launched a national campaign against it (Croney and Smith 2003).    
 
The PDNPA were conscious of the influence they held over the Forum and 
wanted the initial stages of the Forum design to be seen as legitimate. Consequently, 
in order to ensure that the PDNPA did not exert excessive control at the initiation of 
the Forum, a Design Group was constructed by the facilitator and the PDNPA to help 
with the Forum design. However, the role of the very first Forum was to set an agenda 
for the rest of the Forums by deciding what the key problems and tensions were that 
needed to be resolved in the Management Plan. Therefore, although the PDNPA, and 
the Design Group, did enjoy much influence in the first stage of the decision-making 
process, this was combined with influence from the participating stakeholders in the 
first Forum (Elstub 2009). In general much of the agenda did derive from public 
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deliberation itself, as the theory advocates it should, although with some influence 
from elites, which might be inescapable in practice. Smith also acknowledges that 
partisan citizen forums tend to have greater agenda-setting powers than mini-publics 
(Smith 2009: 171). In mini-publics the agenda is determined by the commissioning 
authority. For Fereudi (2005: 117-19) this means they are easily open to manipulation.  
 
Deliberation 
 
Two issues in relation to deliberation must be considered. Firstly, who did the 
deliberating and secondly the form of deliberation. Each of the aspects will be 
considered in turn with respect to the Stanage Forum. 
 
The Deliberators 
 
Decisions can be framed through controlling who participates in the 
deliberations (Reich 1988: 140-1; Rippe and Schaber 1999: 82), and therefore the 
manner in which the PDNPA has sought to engage citizens in the Forum is of 
paramount importance.  As with all democratic arrangements, who participates and to 
what level and who does not participate and why, determines the nature of the conflict 
and ultimately the decision (Schattsneider 1975). In the ISS all affected by a decision 
will participate equally in the exchange of public reasons together. Achieving the 
inclusion of all in debates is a key problem facing the institutionalisation of micro 
deliberative democracy in practice, due to logistical difficulties. To have all citizens 
meet together and deliberate together, actually or virtually, is an empirical 
impossibility, especially if debates are to be inclusive and have depth (Bohman 1996: 
2; Parkinson 2006: 151; Elstub 2007: 15). Consequently, micro conceptions of 
deliberative democracy can be quite exclusive over who gets to deliberate, in order to 
ensure quality deliberation (Hendriks 2006: 492). Furthermore, collective action 
problems mean that not all affected want to participate directly in decision-making 
(Olson 1965).  
 
Inclusion is made easier with forums like Stanage as it is operating at a 
decentralised level and this means that decisions affect less people, alleviating the 
scale problem (Warren 2002: 188-189; Elstub 2007: 16). Decentralisation can also 
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enable citizens to have a potentially greater influence on decisions, which can lead to 
greater efficacy and, consequently, greater levels of participation (Elstub 2008b: 194). 
Nevertheless even in a decentred forum like Stanage, significant problems in 
including all stakeholders in open, public, transparent and inclusive debate pertain 
(Connelly et al 2006: 273). In contrast mini-publics adapt to scale, not necessarily 
through decentralisation (although they can be used at different levels of governance), 
but through random sampling. 
 
In the Stanage Forum there were no formal barriers to participating, as anyone 
who wanted to was allowed to attend. Therefore the participants in the Stanage Forum 
are predominantly self-selected representatives from the local community and 
voluntary associations. Numbers of participants in the forum ranged from 35-67. In 
total approximately one hundred and fifty different people participated in the first four 
Forums. However, informal barriers also exist which prevent people from 
participating in such forums. Socio-economic inequalities certainly affect the potential 
for certain socio-economic groups to participate equally (Schattsneider 1975; Verba et 
al 1995; Smith 2009). There is also an element of self-selection with mini-publics 
(Goodin 2008: 14), but through random selection they overcome the socio-economic 
variables that infect open participation mechanisms (Smith 2009).  
 
Other informal barriers include being unaware of the forum. One of the 
principal factors in ensuring participation is to ask people to participate, and this can 
help address socio-economic barriers to participation (Smith 2009: 164). Again this is 
why mini-publics are useful as those randomly selected are then invited and usually 
accept, and if they do not then someone with similar socio-demographics is invited 
instead (Smith 2009: 166). Although this presents a danger of ‘endogeneity’ (Cohen 
2007: 223). Furthermore, Phillips, who is committed to a ‘politics of presence’ (1999: 
117) is still critical of mini-publics ability to include all relevant groups and opinions. 
The PDNPA made a genuine effort to contact easily identifiable stakeholders and to 
advertise the Stanage Forum, all be it through predominantly middle class media. 
Another informal barrier is being unable to attend due to the time and location. The 
time and day of the week (i.e. weekend, weekday; evening, daytime) for the Forums 
was altered with the hope of enabling all stakeholders to participate, at least in part of 
the process, if they wished (Elstub 2009). Another solution to the scale problem is 
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virtual deliberation, which also enables people to participate in deliberation at their 
own convenience. In the Stanage Forum those unable to attend the Forums have been 
able to participate in the on-line discussion on the website. Such electronic and 
interactive media can therefore facilitate openness and inclusive deliberation (Ward et 
al 2003: 291-2).  
There are significant inequalities of power and resources between the 
associations involved and although they have all been involved in some manner, they 
have participated in different ways and to different extents.  For example, some 
associations were involved in both the Design Group and the Steering Group, and 
attendances in the Forums themselves have varied considerably. There have been 
participants from each of the three key stakeholder groups at all four of the Forums, 
although some stakeholders have been represented more than others. Recreationalists 
were the best represented, especially climbers and in particular the BMC. There have 
been notable absentees from particular interests; specifically from the motorised 
recreational section, the local cement works factory, a gas works company and local 
transport companies. This is a key difference between instances of micro deliberation. 
Mini-publics are able to remove many of the inequalities of presence through random 
selection (Elstub 2009).  
 
Therefore representation is required to ensure all those who are affected by a 
decision, but do not participate in making the decision, or in the deliberations, are 
represented. Civil society associations are seen as an important source of 
representation and in the Stanage Forum represented a diverse array of interests and 
identities. If members of these associations were unable to attend, or were not 
sufficiently interested in, the Forums themselves, another member of their association 
could still represent them, as they are likely to share some relevant interests or 
identities or through virtue of being a member of the same association. Mini-publics 
also rely on representation, but descriptive representation. Here representatives are not 
accountable as there is no opportunity for recourse by those being represented. They 
are representative in the sense that they share key socio-demographics. Due to the 
lack of internal democratic arrangements representatives from associations are 
unlikely to be accountable to those they represent either.  
 
The Process of Deliberation 
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In the first Stanage Forum and steering group meetings all participants agreed 
to principles that clearly embody the ideals of deliberative democracy. Embodied in 
these procedures are the ideals that problems should be resolved through discussion, 
aimed at consensus on the common good, that all affected should have a chance to 
participate, and that all views should be listened to and included in the debate (Croney 
and Smith 2003: 16). The Stanage Forum can therefore be considered a genuine 
attempt to approximate democratic deliberation in practice, as they strongly resemble 
the principles of the ISS (Habermas 1990). 
 
Despite the use of decentralization and representation, problems of scale, 
within the Forum, affected the deliberative process and the opportunities for all to 
deliberate together. The forty to seventy people typically attending the Stanage 
Forum, is too many to ensure effective, equal and inclusive deliberation, as the 
number of people that can deliberate together is very limited (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996: 131). This is a strength of citizen juries, but not deliberative opinion 
polls or citizen assemblies, which also have larger numbers of participants. However, 
the small number that participate in citizen juries precludes other key norms of 
deliberative democracy being approximated, such as ensuring all affected participate 
or are represented in the decision-making process, and that all relevant reasons are 
made public. Therefore innovative mechanisms are required to adapt deliberative 
democracy to the scale of the decision and participants affected. In all the Stanage 
Forums participants were split into mixed stakeholder groups, with seven in each 
group, with each group discussing the same issues. This method allowed each 
individual a reasonable amount of opportunity to participate, and with the mixture of 
groups, still allows people to hear a range of views and express their views to a range 
of people. Such methods are common in German Planning Cells, Deliberative 
Opinion Polls and Consensus Conferences. This is a trade-off between the ISS, in 
which all participants are involved in the same debate, and the practical necessities of 
real life deliberation. Such methods can also reduce the potential for the development 
of factions that would otherwise offset the benefits of the deliberative process. This is 
because in small groups, factions and ‘internal psychological divisions’ are less likely 
to develop. Moreover, these subgroups do not need to have ‘rigidly defined 
boundaries’, if the subgroups have revolving membership, which was the case in the 
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Stanage Forum (Thompson and Hoggert 2001: 358). One of the deficiencies of the 
methods used here in the Stanage Forum is that there is a lack of communication and 
debate between each sub-group, meaning all participants do not get to hear all 
arguments which could potentially affect their preferences, so the sub-groups need to 
be combined with deliberative plenary sessions (Thompson and Hoggert 2001). 
Deliberation also occurred in the Steering Group but with much smaller numbers, 
with a maximum of seventeen participants, which is much closer to the optimum. 
Consequently the Steering Group all deliberated together and sub-groups were not 
needed (Elstub 2009). 
 
The steering group agreed to be transparent and to publicise their minutes and 
decisions through the website, and by reporting back to the Forum (PDNPA 2001; 
Connelly et al 2006: 273). Without such processes the general Forum participants are 
completely excluded from hearing the reasons of the representatives, and the element 
of publicity, an essential aspect of deliberative democracy, is significantly 
compromised. The Steering Group did report back to the forum and all meeting 
reports were posted on the PDNPA website, but communication from the Steering 
Group to the forum was still something that could have been increased to ensure 
greater accountability. For example after the Steering Group had drafted the 
Management Plan and it was presented at the fourth Forum, the Forum participants 
were not given the opportunity to raise any issues as to whether it accurately 
encapsulated the decisions made at the previous Forum. Steering Group members 
were given an opportunity to justify their decisions, but Forum participants were not 
given the opportunity to challenge them.ii In practice micro deliberation requires 
representation, but it should be an interactive and deliberative relationship; and not 
one where the represented just receive reasons, but one where they can give them as 
well (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Young 2000: 125). 
 
The ideal in a deliberative democracy is that all participants should receive the 
same information, as it can impact upon preferences. However, in the Stanage Forum 
information supplied by the Technical Groups was only presented to the Steering 
Group because of insufficient time for the Technical Groups to report all their 
information to the Forums, meaning the Forum did not receive the information 
directly. Again then there is a trade-off between the ideal and the practical need for 
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efficiency and perhaps displaying the information on the website is a good method to 
provide a balance between these two aims. In general though partisan forums are 
effective at publicising their events and processes; making them transparent. We see 
this here with the Stanage Forum, as the various associational members disseminate 
details of the forum to their members. In contrast this is a weakness of mini-publics, 
with the broader public tending to be unaware of the mini-public, let alone its process 
(Smith 2009: 177). 
 
Decision-Making 
 
For Habermas consensus is the ostensible goal of the ISS. Due to the 
relationship between deliberative democracy and public reason, where participants are 
encouraged to find reasons that all affected will find convincing, it has been suggested 
that decisions in a deliberative democracy could be consensual as participants form 
and find common interests though the exchange of reasons (Habermas 1996: 17-19; 
Cohen 1989: 23; Elstub 2006: 308). A consensus building approach to decision-
making was explicitly employed in the Stanage Forum from the outset.  
 
Despite this there certainly was no agreement upon all the specifics of the 
Management Plan, but perhaps there was a broader agreement upon its overarching 
general principles. Other deliberative theorists also argue that if consensus is not 
reached, then compromise, achieved under deliberatively democratic conditions, 
might be the best alternative (Dryzek 1990: 16-17; Festenstein 2002: 92-95; 
Richardson 2002; Warren 2002: 185). Deliberation helps make compromise easier to 
achieve, as it improves understanding of alternatives and rival positions, which can in 
turn lead to respect and empathy (Warren 2002: 184; Elstub 2008b: 67). It is 
something like a deliberative compromise that was reached in the Stanage Forum over 
the general principles of the Management Plan. Due to the absence of consensus or 
deliberative comprise, on the specific aspects of the Management Plan, voting was 
necessary. However, voting occurred following deliberatively democratic debate, 
therefore the aggregation was of transformed, post-deliberative preferences. The fact 
that voting did have to occur for decisions to be made does indicate the necessity for 
participation to be evenly spread across all interested stakeholders.  It was unfair that 
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the BMC had more votes than any other association due to having more participants at 
the forum (Elstub 2009).   
 
Many of the decisions in forming the specifics of the Management Plan were 
not taken in the Forum itself, but in the Steering Group (2002: Section 2.4).The 
Steering Group used a range of decision-making procedures, at times accepting the 
advice of the technical experts, at others rejecting it and taking suggestions from the 
Forum or website. Some of the Steering Group’s decisions were made through 
consensus, but in general it took majority decisions as the necessity of time and the 
need for decisions to be made overrode the desire for consensus (Connelly et al 2006: 
273). Similar mixed processes of decision-making occur in mini-publics, however, 
there is less incentive to achieve consensus and compromise in many of these, as they 
are not making binding decisions, and the unpartisan nature of the representation 
means that the participants will not be affected by the decision themselves. It is 
argued that this makes mini-publics more willing to change preferences in light of 
reason, precisely because they are not partisan. This may be the case, but what the 
Stanage Forum indicates is that partisan deliberators will adapt preferences in light of 
reasons offered, and are willing to compromise in order to achieve working decisions 
(Elstub 2009), or at least likely to lead to deliberative compromise (Immergut 1995: 
205; Hendriks et al 2007: 370; Elstub 2008a: 191); especially if local and specific 
issues are being addressed (Fung and Wright 2003; Elstub 2008a: 191). 
 
The Steering Group’s considerable decision-making powers were 
predominantly justified because the output from the Forum was uncoordinated, with 
little or no direction. The co-ordination problems have been enhanced due to some of 
the procedures in the Forum, which have divided participants into small, mixed 
stakeholder, deliberative sub-groups. Here we see a discursive dilemma. The 
Management Plan could reflect the preferences that received majority support in the 
Forum vote, regardless of their compatibility. Alternatively decisions could be co-
ordinated to be rationally consistent, but be unresponsive to the Forum’s preferences.  
The former is more democratic, but at a sacrifice to deliberation and the latter more 
deliberative, but at a loss to democracy (Pettit 2003: 138).  Petit suggests that it is 
more important that decisions meet deliberative requirements and are rationally 
compatible (Pettit 2003: 155), which is what the Steering Group in the Stanage Forum 
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attempted to ensure. Such dilemmas affect all decision-making and therefore mini-
publics too. However, as mini-publics rarely make decisions the dilemma is relocated 
to the commissioner of the event e.g. the relevant local authority. In this sense 
partisan forums that are empowered to make binding decisions, such as Stanage, are 
able to resolve this dilemma through its own process, perhaps more democratically. 
The use of a representative institution like a steering group can therefore be justified 
from a deliberative perspective. 
 
Implementation  
 
Since 2002 implementation of the Management Plan has been ongoing and it 
has been suggested it is stalling as the original conflicts that were present at the start 
of the Forum, between recreationalists and environmentalists, over access and 
conservation are still persisting (Connelly et al 2006: 272). Certainly more research is 
required on the implementation of the Stanage Forum’s Management Plan to establish 
if this is the case. 
 
Nevertheless, many of the aspects of the Management Plan have been 
implemented and many of the stakeholders have been actively involved in this 
implementation. Theory suggests that the main advantage of stakeholders being 
actively involved in decision-making processes is that once the decision has been 
made, it generally becomes easier to implement (Fung and Wright 2001: 26; 
Richardson and Connelly 2002: 16-17). Here mini-publics fail as those affected by the 
decision are deliberately not included in it (Goodin 2008).  If the deliberative process 
did end in consensus and include all affected as stipulated by the ISS then this would 
certainly be the case, as all would have consented to all aspects of the binding 
decisions. As already stipulated these normative criteria are impossible to realise in 
practice. Nevertheless the fact that stakeholders, who have participated in making the 
decision, are more likely to see the process as a legitimate one and, therefore, accept 
the consequential decision, even if it is not what they initially hoped for, than if it was 
imposed by an external authority without their involvement. Here we see a potential 
advantage of partisan micro-deliberative forums over mini-publics, where those 
making the decisions (or recommendations for decisions) will not be bound by the 
decisions or required to implement them (Smith 2009: 187). As Fung argues 
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partisanship therefore essential at some stage of the decision-making process if is 
decisions are to be supported and implemented (Fung 2003: 345).  If the members 
have been engaged in democratic debate about these issues themselves, they can see 
how their own views may have influenced that debate, again making the resulting 
decision even more legitimate. The participants can then help in the implementation 
of the decision, either through the carrying out of the services/ activities set out, or in 
disseminating information about the decision. Due to the fact that decisions are now 
easier to enforce, more options become available in decision-making (Fung and 
Wright 2001: 18). Many of the voluntary associations, involved in the Forum, have 
been actively involved in the implementation of much of the Management Plan and 
have been able to disseminate the content of the Management Plan and advice on the 
most environmentally friendly ways to access the Estate, to their members. Although 
this has not led to complete compliance, by all recreationalists, with all the decisions 
made in the Plan, it is suggested that implementation ‘has been much easier and much 
more successful than before the Forum process began’, and in comparison with the 
previous top-down Management Plans (PDNPA 2008). 
 
It is further suggested that participatory processes mean that powerful 
organisations have less ability to veto any decisions that they dislike because their co-
operation will become less important, due to the increased co-operation of other 
stakeholders (Cohen and Rogers 1995: 65-6; Smith 2001: 78).  However, the 
experience of the Stanage Forum process suggests that certain organisations are so 
powerful, and their co-operation so vital to implementing decisions, that they can 
derail any decisions they dislike.  There were several  pertinent examples of this in the 
Stanage Forum including local bus companies, the cement and gas works, none of 
which the PDNPA has been devolved sufficient powers to control, despite proposals 
included in the Management Plan that aimed to increase and integrate bus provision to 
the Estate and reduce pollution.  Consequently, these companies cannot be forced to 
abide by these proposals and the PDNPA was left to try and persuade, negotiate, and 
compromise with these companies in order to implement these proposals, which 
ultimately proved unsuccessful. A key problem to the success of micro forums is that 
many stakeholder groups will be unwilling for authority to be democratically shared, 
when a continuation of conflict will more effectively further their interests, especially 
if they have ‘a lot to lose’ (Hendriks 2002: 65; Richardson and Connelly 2002: 21; 
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Cohen and Rogers 2003: 252; Hendriks 2006).  This certainly seems to be the case 
with local bus companies, the cement works and gas company, as they have been able 
to achieve the promotion of their interests without having to participate in the Stanage 
Forum, where they would have had to justify and defend these interests publicly, with 
reasons. 
 
If deliberative democracy is to be genuinely institutionalised, and deliberation 
and decision-making linked, then it is essential that micro forums, like Stanage, have 
binding decision making power to ensure the decisions are implemented and enforced. 
If micro deliberative sites do result in binding and enforceable decisions, stakeholders 
are more likely to want to participate, precisely because they have a lot to lose or gain, 
as the most effective way to influence outcomes will be through participation in the 
forums (Fung and Wright 2001: 24; Hendriks 2006; Elstub 2008b: 149). Smith points 
to the extent a public authority will cede power to a democratic citizen forum is a 
limiting factor over their relationship to decision-making (Smith 2009: 173). This is 
certainly the case, but we also see how other powerful organisations, often private 
firms, can limit decision-making. Much then depends on how much power the public 
authority has been ceded to in the first place. 
 
Review 
 
Deliberative democracy is not a decision-making mechanism that leads to 
‘final’ decisions, as the process often reveals deeper problems than had been 
anticipated,  preferences continue to change in light of new information arising, and 
because participants will change over time. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that all 
decisions remain contestable (Pettit 2003: 156), as they have done in the Stanage 
Forum. Although the Management Plan was ratified in the fourth Forum in 2002, it 
was not the end of the forum or the democratic deliberative process, as there has been 
an annual Forum held to evaluate the Management Plan, its implementation and its 
effectiveness. Several proposals, incorporated in the original Management Plan have 
been reviewed, changed, and implemented through this process, although the 
overriding principles, of the Management Plan, agreed in the Forum have remained 
the same. Mini-publics could be used to review decisions too, but they have rarely 
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been used in this manner and are usually terminated after an initial recommendation 
has been reached.  
 
Unpartisan participation is perhaps more difficult to sustain because 
partisanship provides greater motivation to participate and therefore increases the 
sustainability of the forums (Fung 2003: 345; Parkinson 2006: 134). Although they 
might be more sustainable than unpartisan forums, despite attracting a large number 
of new participants, levels of participation in these review Forums has declined. The 
Steering Group has also continued to meet and review the Plan, holding 
approximately four meetings a year to do this. Overall the Steering Group has gained 
in power over the Forum since the launch of the Management Plan. The Forum 
meetings now have fewer opportunities for deliberative participation, and tend to be 
dominated by reports from the Steering Group. The Forum is now used more as a 
body to ratify suggestions for reform that have originated from the Steering Group, 
rather a deliberative event to produce suggestions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Decision-making is implicit in the ideal of deliberative democracy, and 
particularly identifiable in instances of micro deliberation. However, there remain 
significant challenges to linking micro deliberative democracy with partisan decision-
making, which the case study of the Stanage Forum highlights. This evidence is 
important as most empirical research on micro deliberation has been on mini-publics, 
which tend not to result in decisions, or include those affected by decisions. 
Ultimately many trade-offs need to be made between the ideal of deliberative 
democracy and its approximation in practice. The trade-offs, between ideal and 
practice, are to do with empirical necessities, which vary from situation to situation, 
so the nature of the trade-offs differs from context to context. However an 
investigation of the Stanage Forum has identified some general problems, and 
solutions, in relation to the various decision-making stages and demonstrates the type 
of trade-offs that are likely, and necessary, in cases of micro-deliberation, where 
partisan participants deliberate with the aim of making decisions. It further suggests 
that different trade-offs are made to those found in mini-publics. In general partisan 
forums are able to deal with agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and 
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review more successfully than mini-publics. In contrast mini-publics are more 
inclusive and deliberative. Nevertheless, the Stanage Forum suggests good 
deliberation can occur in partisan forums too. However, this is just one case study, 
and much more empirical evidence from deliberative partisan citizen forums is still 
required.  
 
In many ways Smith is right to argue that mini-publics represent more of a 
‘protected space’ than partisan forums because citizens are not directly collaborating 
with public officials, where citizens are usually at a disadvantage, particularly with 
respect to time and technical knowledge (Smith 2009: 172). Consequently Smith 
argues that although partisan forums tend to exercise more power than mini-publics, 
this does not mean that the citizens participating in them do (Smith 2009: 172). 
However, mini-publics can also be manipulated and framed, and so it is perhaps not 
as clear cut as this. Smith (2009) is, though, certainly right so argue that neither mini-
publics nor partisan forums can approximate all the norms of deliberative democracy, 
as we have seen here. As Dryzek (2007: 246) points out ‘one very large institutional 
design question concerns the balance of, and roles for, partisan and non-partisan 
deliberators.’ Ultimately we must investigate how best to combine these micro 
deliberative institutions to achieve the most appropriate trade-offs between theory and 
practice available. 
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